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Why Replication is Overrated 
 
Current debates about the replication crisis in psychology take it for granted that direct 
replication is valuable and focus their attention on questionable research practices in 
regard to statistical analyses. This paper takes a broader look at the notion of replication 
as such. It is argued that all experimentation/replication involves individuation 
judgments and that research in experimental psychology frequently turns on probing 
the adequacy of such judgments. In this vein, I highlight the ubiquity of conceptual and 
material questions in research, and I argue that replication is not as central to 
psychological research as it is sometimes taken to be. 
 
1. Introduction: The “Replication Crisis” 
In the current debate about replicability in psychology, we can distinguish between (1) the question of 
why not more replication studies are done (e.g., Romero 2017) and (2) the question of why a significant 
portion (more than 60%) of studies, when they are done, fail  to replicate (I take this number from the 
Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Debates about these questions have been dominated by two 
assumptions, namely, first, that it is in general desirable that scientists conduct replication studies that 
come as close as possible to the original, and second, that the low replication rate can often be 
attributed to statistical problems with many initial studies, sometimes referred to as “p-hacking” and 
“data-massaging.”1 
                                                          
1 An important player in this regard is the statistician Andrew Gelman who has been using his blog as a 
public platform to debate methodological problems with mainstream social psychology 
(http://andrewgelman.com/). 
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I do not wish to question that close (or “direct”) replications can sometimes be epistemically 
fruitful. Nor do I wish to question the finding that are severe problems in the statistical analyses of many 
psychological experiments. However, I contend that the focus on formal problems in data analyses has 
come at the expense of questions about the notion of replication as such. In this paper I hope to remedy 
this situation, highlighting in particular the implications of the fact that psychological experiments in 
general are infused with conceptual and material presuppositions. I will argue that once we gain a better 
understanding of what this entails with respect to replication, we get a deeper appreciation of 
philosophical issues that arise in the investigative practices of psychology. Among other things, I will 
show that replication is not as central to these practices as it is often made out to be. 
The paper has three parts. In part 1 I will briefly review some philosophical arguments as to why 
there can be no exact replications and, hence, why attempts to replicate always involve individuation 
judgments. Part 2 will address a distinction that is currently being debated in the literature, i.e., that 
between direct and conceptual replication, highlighting problems and limitations of both. Part 3, finally, 
will argue that a significant part of experimental research in psychology is geared toward exploring the 
shape of specific phenomena or effects, and that the type of experimentation we encounter there is not 
well described as either direct or conceptual replication. 
 
2. The Replication Crisis and the Ineliminability of Concepts 
When scientists and philosophers talk about successfully replicating an experiment, they typically mean 
that they performed the same experimental operations/interventions. But what does it mean to 
perform “the same” operations as the ones performed by a previous experiment? With regard to this 
question, I take it to be trivially true that two experiments cannot be identical: At the very least, the 
time variable will differ. Replication can therefore at best aim for similarity (Shavit & Ellison 2017), as is 
also recognized by some authors in psychology. In this vein, Lynch et al (2015) write that “[e]xact 
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replication is impossible” (Lynch et al 2015, 2), arguing that at most advocates of direct replication can 
aim for is to get “as close as possible,” i.e., to conduct an experiment that is similar to the previous one. 
In the literature, such experiments are also referred to as “direct replications.” (e.g., Pashler & Harris 
2912).2 
The notion of similarity is, of course, also notoriously problematic (e.g., Goodman 1955), since 
any assertion of similarity between A and B has to specify with regard to what they are similar. In the 
context of experimentation, the relevant kinds of specifications already presuppose conceptual and 
material assumptions, many of which are not explicated, about the kinds of factors one is going to treat 
as relevant to the subject matter (see also Collins 1985, chapter 2). Such conceptual decisions will 
inform what one takes to be the “experimental result” down the line (Feest 2016). For example, If I am 
interested in whether listening to Mozart has a positive effect on children’s IQ, I will design an 
experiment, which involves a piece by Mozart as the independent variable and the result of a 
standardized IQ-test at a later point. Now if I get an effect, and if I call it a Mozart effect, I am thereby 
assuming that the piece of music I used was causally responsible qua being a piece by Mozart. 
Moreover, when I claim that it’s an effect on intelligence, I am assuming that the test I used at the end 
of the experiment in fact measured intelligence. These judgments rely on conceptual assumptions 
already built into the experiment qua choice of independent and dependent variables. In addition, I 
need material assumptions to the effect that potentially confounding variables have been controlled for. 
I take this example to show that whenever we investigate an effect under a description, we cannot avoid 
making conceptual assumptions when determining whether an experiment has succeeded or failed. This 
goes for original experiments as well as for replications. 
                                                          
2 Both advocates and critics of direct replication sometimes contrast such replications with “conceptual” 
replications” (Lynch et al 2015). We will return to this distinction below. 
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One obvious rejoinder to this claim might be to say that replication attempts need not 
investigate effects under a description. They might simply imitate what the original experiment did, with 
no particular commitment to what is being manipulated or measured. But even if direct replications 
need not explicitly replicate effects under a description, I argue that they nonetheless have to make 
what Lena Soler calls “individuation judgments” (Soler 2011). For example, the judgment that 
experiment 2 is relevantly similar to experiment 1 involves the judgment that experiment 2 does not 
introduce any confounding factors that were absent in experiment 1. However, such judgments have to 
rely on some assumptions about what is relevant and what is irrelevant to the experiment, where these 
assumptions are often unstated auxiliaries. For example, I may (correctly or incorrectly) tacitly assume 
that temperature in the lab is irrelevant and hence ignore this variable in my replication attempt. 
It is important to recognize that the individuation judgments made in experiments have a high 
degree of epistemic uncertainty. Specifically, I want to highlight what I call the problem of “conceptual 
scope,” which arises from the question of how the respective independent and dependent variables are 
described. Take, for example, the above case where I play a specific piece by Mozart in a major key at a 
fast pace. A lot hangs on what I take to be the relevant feature of this stimulus: the fact that it’s a piece 
by Mozart, the fact that it’s in a major key, the fact that it’s fast? etc. Depending on how I describe the 
stimulus, I might have different intuitions about possible confounders to pay attention to. For example, 
if I take the fact that a piece is by Mozart as the relevant feature of the independent variable, I might 
control for familiarity with Mozart. If I take the relevant feature to be the key, I might control for mood.  
Crucially, even though scientists make decisions on the basis of (implicit or explicit) assumptions about 
conceptual scope, their epistemic situation is typically such that they don’t know what is the “correct” 
scope. This highlights a feature of psychological experiments that is rarely discussed in the literature 
about the replication crisis, i.e., the deep epistemic uncertainty and conceptual openness of much 
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research. This concerns both the initial and the replication study. Thus, concepts are ineliminable in 
experimental research, while at the same time being highly indeterminate. 
 
3. Is the dichotomy between direct and less direct replication pragmatically useful? 
One way of paraphrasing what was said above is that all experiments involve individuation judgments 
and that this concerns both original and replication studies. While this serves as a warning against a 
naïve reliance on direct (qua non-conceptual) replication, it might be objected that direct replications 
nonetheless make unique epistemic contributions. This is indeed claimed by advocates of both direct 
and less direct (=”conceptual”) replication alike. I will now evaluate claims that have aligned the 
distinction between direct and “conceptual” with some relevant distinctions in scientific practice, such 
as that between the aim of establishing the existence of a phenomenon and that of generalizing from 
such an existence claim on the one and that between reliability and validity on the other. I will argue 
that while these distinctions are heuristically useful, but on closer inspection bring to the fore exactly 
the epistemological issues just discussed. 
 
3.1 Existence vs. Generalizability 
Many scientists take it as given that there cannot be two identical experiments, but nonetheless argue 
that there is significant epistemic merit in trying to get close enough., i.e., to conduct direct replications. 
In turn, the notion of a direct replication is frequently contrasted with that of a “conceptual” replication. 
In a nutshell, direct replications essentially try to redo “the same” experiment (or at least something 
very close), whereas the conceptual replications try to operationalize the same question or 
concept/effect in a different way. The advantage of direct replications, as viewed by its advocates, is 
that by being able to redo an experiment faithfully and to create the same effect, one can show that the 
effect was real: “Exact and very close replications establish the basic existence and stability of a 
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phenomenon by falsifying the (null) hypothesis that observations simply reflect random noise” (LeBel et 
al, forthcoming, 7). 
Advocates of conceptual replication don’t deny this advantage of close replications, but hold 
that we want more than to establish that a given effect – created under very specific experimental 
conditions – is real. We want to know whether our findings about it can be generalized to: “When the 
goal is generalization, we argue that ‘imperfect’ conceptual replications that stretch the domain of 
research may be more useful” (Lynch et al 2015, 2). From a strictly Popperian perspective, the idea that 
non-falsification of the hypothesis of random error can provide proof of stability and existence is 
questionable , of course. But even if we abandon Popperian ideology here and take the falsification of 
H0 (that the initial effect was due to random error) to point to the truth of H1 (that there is a stable 
effect), the question is how to describe the effect. In other words, when claiming to have confirmed an 
effect, we have to say what kind of effect it is. And there we face the following dilemma: 
a) Either we describe the effect as highly specific to very local experimental circumstances, 
involving the choice of a specific independent variable, delivered in a specific way etc. 
b) Or we describe it in slightly broader terms, e.g., as a Mozart effect. 
Advocates of direct replication might indeed endorse something like a), thereby exhibiting the kind of 
caution that motivated early operationists, in that no claim is made beyond the confines of a specific 
experiment. If, on the other hand, psychologists endorsed a description such as b), they would 
immediately run into the question of conceptual scope, i.e., the question under what description the 
independent variable can be said to have caused an effect. I argue that no amount of direct replication 
can answer this question, and hence, even if direct replication can confirm the existence of an effect, it 
cannot say what kind of effect. By asserting this, I am not saying that it’s never useful to do a direct 
replication. My claim is merely that it will tell us relatively little. More pointedly: Direct replication can 
(perhaps) provide evidence for the existence of something, but it cannot say existence of what. Rolf 
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Zwaan makes a similar point when he states that “replication studies “tell us about the reliability of 
those findings. They don’t tell us much about their validity.” (Zwaan 2013). 
In a similar vein, I argue that direct replication, with its narrow focus on ruling out random error, 
is epistemically unproductive, because it has nothing to say about systematic error. Systematic error 
arises if one erroneously attributes an effect to a specific feature of the experiment, when it is in fact 
due to another feature of the experiment. This can include, but is not limited to, the above-mentioned 
problem of conceptual scope. Fiedler et al. (2012) make a similar point when they argue that a narrow 
focus on falsification (with the aim of avoiding false positives) can be detrimental to the research 
process. Differently put, by privileging direct replication, we are not in a position to inquire about the 
kind of effect in question. This question, I argue, is best addressed by paying close attention to the 
possibility of systematic error, and hence by doing conceptual work. In other words, experimentally 
probing into systematic errors of conceptual scope is a valuable and productive part of the research 
process as it enables scientists to gradually explore what kind of effect (if any) they are looking at.3 
 
3.2 Generality 
I have argued that (a) scientists typically produce effects under a description and (b) that it can be 
epistemically productive to probe the scope of the description and to investigate the possibility of 
systematic error with regard to experiments that draw on such descriptions. It is epistemically 
productive, because it forces scientists to explore the nature and boundaries of the effect they are 
investigating. With this I have argued against a narrow focus on direct replication and I have cautioned 
against overstating the epistemic merits of such replication. But when we are concerned with effects 
                                                          
3 I take this to be a contribution to arguments that philosophers of experimentation have made for a 
long time; e.g., Mayo 1996. 
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under a description, we are confronted with questions about the adequacy of the description. It is this 
question that advocates of “conceptual replication” claim to be able to address when they emphasize 
that their approach can deliver generality (over mere existence). 
We have to distinguish between two notions of generality, namely (a) what kinds of descriptions 
one can generalize or infer to within the experiment, and (b) does the effect in question hold outside the 
lab (see Feest & Steinle 2016). These types of generality are also sometimes referred to as internal vs. 
external validity, respectively (Campbell & Stanley 1966; Guala 2012), where the former refers to the 
quality of inferences within an experiment and the latter refers to the quality of inferences from a lab to 
the world. The notion of generalizability raises questions about two kinds of validity. My focus here will 
be on internal validity, i.e., with the question of whether the effect generated in an experiment really 
exists as described by the scientist.4  
Internal validity can fail to hold because of epistemic uncertainties regarding confounding 
variables both internal and external to experimental subjects. For example, prior musical training might 
make a difference to how one responds to Mozart music, but the experimenter may not have taken this 
into consideration in their design. But internal validity can also fail to hold is by virtue of what I have 
referred to as the problem of conceptual scope (for example, we may refer to the effect as a Mozart 
effect when it is in fact a Major-key effect). Effectively, when I treat a major-key effect as a Mozart 
effect, I have misidentified the relevant causal feature of the stimulus. In turn, this means that I will 
neglect to control for major/minor key as I will regard this as irrelevant, which can result in systematic 
errors. In both cases, scientists can go wrong in their individuation judgment. What is at stake is not 
whether there is an effect, but what kind of effect it is. Now, given that those kinds of problems can 
                                                          
4 In this respect I differ from some advocates of conceptual replication, who have highlighted external 
validity as a desideratum (E.g., Lynch 1982, 3/4). 
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occur, we turn to the question of whether “conceptual replication” has an answer. I will now argue that 
it does not. 
To explain this, let me return to the above characterization of conceptual replication, according 
to which such replication consists in repeating an experiment, using different operationalizations of the 
same construct. For example, a conceptual replication of an experiment about the Mozart effect might 
operationalize the concept Mozart effect differently by using a different piece of Mozart music and/or a 
different measure of spatial reasoning. But there is a major caveat here: If I want to compare the results 
of two experiments that operationalized the same construct differently, I already have to presuppose 
that both operationalizations in fact have the same conceptual scope, i.e., that they in fact individuate 
the same effect. But this would be begging the question, since after all – given the epistemic uncertainty 
and conceptual openness highlighted above – that’s precisely what’s at issue. Differently put, 
experiment 2 might or might not achieve the same result as experiment 1, but the reason for this would 
be underdetermined by the experimental data. Thus, the problem of conceptual scope prevents us from 
being able to say whether we have succeeded in our conceptual replication. 
Given the uncertainties as to whether one has in fact succeeded in conceptually replicating a 
given experiment, I am weary of the language of replication here. If anything, I would argue that the 
method in question should be regarded as a research strategy that is aimed at helping to demarcate and 
explore the very subject matter under investigation. But as I will argue now, this is perhaps better 
described as exploration, not as replication. 
 
4. Putting Replication in its Proper Place 
The conclusion of the previous paragraphs seems pretty bleak: Direct replication is either extremely 
narrow in what it can deliver or it runs into the joint problems of confounders and conceptual scope. 
Conceptual replication, on the other hand, cannot come to the rescue, because it also runs into the 
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exact same problems. Should we then throw up our hands and conclude that since ultimately neither 
direct nor conceptual replication are possible the crisis of replication is much more severe than we 
previously thought? This would be the wrong conclusion, however. This would only follow if replication 
was in fact as central to research as it is sometimes taken to be. I claim that it is not. My argument for 
these claims has three parts. The first part holds that exploring (the possibility of) systematic errors is an 
important part of the investigative process, which is not well described as replication. Second, if we take 
seriously this process of exploring and delineating the relevant phenomena, we find that there is indeed 
a great deal of uncertainty in psychological research, but this, in and of itself, does not necessarily 
constitute a crisis. Lastly, while it is fair to say that there is a crisis of confidence in current psychology, it 
is not well described as a replication crisis. 
Let me begin with the first point. I have argued that direct replication (even where it is 
successful) is of limited value, because it can at most rule out random error, but completely fails to be 
able to address systematic error. But if we appreciate (as I have argued we should) that direct 
replication inevitably involves individuation judgments, it is obvious that there is always a danger of 
systematic error, because I have to assume that all confounding variables have been controlled for. One 
important class of confounders follows from what I have referred to as the problem of conceptual 
scope, i.e., the difficulty of correctly describing both the independent variable responsible for a given 
effect and the dependent variable.5 Epistemically productive experimental work, I claim, therefore 
needs to focus on systematic errors, specifically those brought about by unstated auxiliary assumptions. 
Indeed, if we look at the story of the Mozart effect, we find that this is exactly what happened. 
This example also nicely illustrates my claim about the conceptual openness and epistemic uncertainty 
                                                          
5 My focus here has been mainly on the former. But of course the problem of conceptual scope concerns 
both. 
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in many areas of experimental psychology. The Mozart effect was first posited by Rauscher and 
colleagues (Rauscher et a. 1993). It can now be regarded as largely debunked. While it is true that 
several people tried (and failed) to replicate the effect (e.g., Newman et al. 1995; Steele 1997), it is 
important to look at the details here. It is not the case that the effect was simply abandoned for lack of 
replicability. Rather, when we look at the back and forth between Rauscher and her critics, we find that 
the discussion turned on the choices and interpretations of independent and dependent variables. In 
this vein, Newman et al (1995) and Steele (1997) used different dependent variables, prompting 
Rauscher to argue that her effect was more narrowly confined to the kind of spatial reasoning measured 
by the Stanford-Binet. I suggest that we interpret this case as one where Rauscher was forced to 
confront (and retract) an unstated auxiliary assumption of her initial study, namely that the spatial 
reasoning subtest of the Stanford-Binet (which she had used as her dependent variable), was 
representative of spatial reasoning more generally. Likewise, her choice of the Mozart’s Sonata for Two 
Pianos in D-major as the independent variable was put under considerable pressure by critics, who 
suggested that the relevant feature of the independent variable was not that it was a piece by Mozart, 
but that it was up-beat and put subjects in a good mood (Chabris 1999). My point here is that the 
debates surrounding the Mozart effect are best described as conceptual work, exploring consequences 
of possible errors that might have arisen from the problem of conceptual scope. At issue, I claim, was 
not primarily whether Rauscher really found an effect, but rather what was the scope of the effect. 
I argue that this is a typical case. Rather than, or in addition to, attempting to conduct direct 
replications of previous experiments, researchers critically probed some hidden assumptions built into 
the design and interpretation of the initial experiment. My point here is both descriptive and normative. 
Thus, I argue that this is a productive way to proceed. However, I claim that it is not well described as 
replication, let alone conceptual replication. Rather, what we see here is a case in which scientists 
explore the empirical contours of a purported effect in the face of a high degree of epistemic 
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uncertainty and conceptual openness, and this is precisely why the case is not well described as 
employing conceptual replication. The reason for this is quite simple: For a conceptual replication to 
occur, one needs to already be in the possession of some well-formed concepts, such that they can be 
operationalized in different ways. It also presupposes that in general the domain is well-understood, 
such that operationalizations can be implemented and confounding variables can be controlled. But this 
completely misses the point that researchers often investigate effects precisely because they don’t have 
a good understanding (and hence concept) of what it is. 
Therefore I argue that while direct replication can only contribute a very small part to the 
research process, conceptual replication cannot make up for the shortcomings of direct replication. 
Instead, productive research should (and frequently does) proceed by exploring, and experimentally 
testing, hypotheses about possible systematic errors in experiment. Such research, I suggest, can 
contribute to conceptual development by helping to explore and fine-tune the shape and scope of 
proposed or existing concepts. The fact that this is riddled with problems does not in and of itself 
constitute a crisis, let alone a replication crisis. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The upshot of the above is that when we talk about the importance of replication, we need to be clear 
on what we mean by replication and why it is so important, precisely. 
In this paper I have argued that if by replication we mean either “direct” or “conceptual” 
replication, we need to first of all be clear that direct replications are not non-conceptual. I then turned 
to some alleged epistemic merits of direct replication, for example that they can establish the existence 
of effects or the reliability of procedures that detect effects. I argued that insofar as such replications 
involve concepts, they run (among other things) into the problem of conceptual scope, i.e., the difficulty 
of determining, on the basis of independent and dependent variables of experiments what precisely is 
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the scope of the effect one is trying to replicate. I highlighted that this is a real and pernicious problem 
in experimental research in psychology, due to the high degree of epistemic uncertainty and conceptual 
openness of many fields of research. 
While my emphasis of the conceptual nature of replication may suggest that I would be more 
favorably inclined toward conceptual replication, I have argued that conceptual replication runs into the 
same problems, and for similar reasons: The very judgement that one has successfully performed a 
conceptual replication of a previous experiment presupposes what is ultimately the aim of the research, 
namely to arrive at a robust understanding of the relevant area of research. This, I argue that since 
conceptual replication presupposes a relatively good grasp of the relevant concepts, it is begging the 
question, and I suggested instead that researchers (should) engage in a process of specifically 
investigating possible systematic errors in original studies as a means to develop the relevant concepts. 
This process is not best described as one of replication, however. Summing up, then, I conclude that in 
general, replications are less useful and important than is widely assumed – at least in the kind of 
psychological research I have focused on in this paper. 
Now, in conclusion let me return to the notion of a crisis in psychology as it is currently 
discussed in the literature. Obviously, I do not mean to deny that there is a crisis of confidence in (social) 
psychology (Earp & Trafimov 2015) as well as in other areas of study. However, based on the analysis 
provided in this paper, I argue that this crisis is not well described as a crisis of replication. Rather, it 
seems to be to a large degree a crisis that turns on questionable research practices with regard to the 
use of statistical methods in psychology (see Gelman & Loken 2014). While acknowledging the valuable 
philosophical and scientific work that is being done in this area, I suggest that a broader focus on the 
notion of replication provides us with a deeper appreciation of the conceptual dynamics characteristic of 
experimental practice. 
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